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Royal Authority and Justice during the French Religious Wars1
 
 
The period of the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598) is traditionally, and 
justifiably, viewed as a time of great monarchical weakness.2  Nevertheless, the 
crown emerged from this crisis with its powers largely intact.  The recovery of the 
authority of the French monarchy under the first Bourbon ruler, Henry IV (1589-
1610), is credited to a combination of the king’s considerable personal charm and his 
effectiveness as a military leader.3  However, the importance of the legacy of his 
Valois predecessors is less often acknowledged, primarily, their insistence on 
upholding the king’s fundamental role as arbiter of the law and, specifically, as the 
enforcer of justice.  This ‘true office of princes’ was central to the maintenance of 
royal authority during the wars and necessitated a close, if fraught, alliance with the 
kingdom’s legal elite, the judges.4  The wars demonstrated both the extent to which 
the king depended on the members of his principal law courts, the parlements, as well 
as the means he used to bypass their frequently obstructive temperaments.  For their 
part, the parlements were determined to uphold their rights and responsibilities: the 
maintenance of law and order, including the security of their local cities, and the 
protection of their members’ interests.5  Either of these matters could potentially bring 
them into conflict with the crown regarding the direction of royal religious policy, a 
situation further complicated by the variety of confessional viewpoints represented in 
the courts themselves.6  In the course of carrying out their duties, tensions were bound 
to arise over the need to accommodate local confessional sensitivities, to attack 
perceived infringements of their judicial powers, and to ensure that the royal will was 
obeyed.  Nowhere was this more vividly demonstrated than in the disputes arising 
from the enforcement of the royal edicts of pacification which sought to bring the 
conflict to an end.  Despite the antagonisms which they aroused, and contrary to the 
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traditional view that the crown was half-hearted in its peace-making efforts, it will be 
argued that the implementation of the edicts (and the policy they represented) should 
be central to our understanding of the fate of royal authority during the religious wars. 
 Although historians (like contemporaries) have often discredited the edicts of 
pacification because, for the most part, they were unsuccessful in establishing lasting 
peace, it was chiefly through them that the king sought to enforce his will during the 
wars.7  Furthermore, it is possible to cast new light on the conflict by removing the 
edicts from their usual peripheral status and focusing on circumscribed religious 
toleration as the central plank of royal policy.8  Crown attempts to establish a degree 
of coexistence between the faiths predated the outbreak of war, and was in large 
measure a response to the fragility of royal authority under a succession of young 
kings.  Such an approach was first tentatively embraced under the brief rule of Francis 
II (1559-1560), in the face of the alarming disorder which accompanied growing 
religious unrest.  Despite periods of armed combat and episodic religious violence, 
throughout most of the reigns of Charles IX (1560-1574) and Henry III (1574-1589), 
at least until 1585, the monarchy turned time and again to officially sanctioned 
toleration as the best way to resolve hostilities and mitigate confessional strife.  From 
1563, following the first war, this policy was embodied in the edicts of pacification 
and was re-embraced by Henry IV in the 1590s, culminating in the Edict of Nantes of 
1598.  However, such an approach was not approved by all parties, notably the 
parlements, who repeatedly obstructed and remonstrated against the registration of the 
edicts.  The resulting antagonism between the crown and its judges became a struggle 
over the location of judicial authority.  Tension was heightened by the royal decision 
to appoint extraordinary officials to enforce its legislation.  Thus, disagreements over 
religious policy became mixed up with concerns about encroachments on 
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parlementaire jurisdiction.  Although historians have nuanced the traditional image of 
the courts as bastions of orthodoxy, in the face of perceived crown bullying their 
members presented a united front.  Nevertheless, the mantle of defending the Catholic 
faith by opposing the royal policy of religious conciliation was more convincingly 
assumed by the Catholic League.  The formation of the noble-led League in 1576, too, 
was a direct response to the most generous of the edicts, that of Beaulieu, which 
provided the Huguenots with extensive rights of worship.  It established a powerful 
body of opinion which would continue to oppose religious toleration, and ultimately 
royal authority, for the rest of the wars, most effectively in the late 1580s.  Despite 
royal ambivalence towards confessional coexistence in anything but the short term, 
the fortunes of the monarchy and its support for toleration became inextricably linked.  
It was in the furnace of the 1560s that this policy was forged, and though it was to 
suffer serious dents in the succeeding decades, no lasting alternative presented itself.  
Despite facing one of its greatest ever challenges, then, it was through the 
enforcement of the edicts of pacification that monarchical authority continued to be 
upheld, despite the confessional discord which divided the realm. 
The consistent and serious efforts undertaken to enforce the terms of the peace 
edicts demonstrate a continuing, if sometimes grudging, respect for royal authority.  
Ultimately, the determination of crown and judiciary to see the king’s justice properly 
defined and enforced, ensured that the period of the religious wars did not represent 
an aberration or discontinuity in the development of the French monarchy.9  Royal 
authority would exhibit a remarkable degree of resilience despite the evident upheaval 
the kingdom faced, and this was not only due to ‘the patterns of governance and 
thought about public power established in the century before 1560’, crucial though 
these foundations were.10  The stability established by Henry IV was as dependent on 
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the judicial provision made by his immediate predecessors as on the robust style of 
rule of Francis I (1515-1547) and Henry II (1547-1559), and was not simply a 
reaction by a stronger king to the crisis wrought by civil war.11  That the monarchy 
was able to reassert its authority so effectively is testimony to the enduring 
importance of the king’s judicial role and the efforts of his judges.  Nowhere was this 
more evident than in the legislation produced by the crown in an effort to restore 
peace to the kingdom.  In order to support this assertion, it is to the provinces of 
France that we must turn to demonstrate how the king’s justice and, therefore, his 
authority was received.  First, however, it is necessary to explore the basis of that 
authority and its relationship with the law. 
I 
Royal authority and the law 
In view of the danger which civil strife posed to the polity, there was perhaps never a 
time when the Roman dictum, ‘the will of the king is the rule of law’, needed to be 
more vigorously applied than during the French religious wars.12  The claim to a 
monopoly of justice was central to the royal prerogative.  However, as theorists 
acknowledged and jurists upheld, the king could not, and ought not, act alone.  From 
Seyssel to Bodin, sixteenth-century thinkers promoted the indispensability of the 
judiciary in the recognition and enforcement of the law.  In particular, parlement and 
monarch ‘were united by the indissoluble tie of the exercise of justice delegated by 
God’.13  The elevation of the judges went hand-in-hand with royal aspirations to 
greater legislative power.14  The sixteenth-century elaboration of the concept that ‘the 
king never dies’ was echoed in the red robes of office worn by the parlementaires at 
the king’s funeral, symbolic of the immortality of royal justice.15  In order for his 
authority to be effective, the king had to delegate judicial power to his magistracy and 
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to consult with it regarding legislative matters.  In turn, the authority of the 
magistrates, as royal representatives, depended on that of the king.16  This symbiosis 
between the king and his judges reaped dividends for both parties, in particular in the 
enhancement of their authority through shared legislative powers.  As a consequence, 
the parlements jealously defended their status as sovereign courts, and with it their 
right to register legislation.  Whatever their pretensions, however, this was not an 
evenly balanced partnership.  Ultimately, the parlements had to bow to royal pressure 
or risk suspension, despite fiercely defended rights of remonstrance.17  The practice of 
the lit de justice, when the king visited a parlement in person and thus reassumed his 
full judicial powers, allowed the crown to push through controversial legislation in the 
face of parlementaire opposition.  Yet the royal presence could also boost the judges’ 
pride, as it indicated that, ‘The king needed parlement in order to express his 
power’.18  Crucially, he should not overstep the mark in flexing his judicial muscle, 
and it was the parlement’s responsibility to ensure that he did not do so.  The elevated 
position of the judiciary entailed responsibilities towards the people but primarily, as 
royal servants, to the crown.  Thus, whilst on the one hand, the Paris parlement 
claimed its constitutional right to protect the interests of the subject,19 the magistracy, 
as royal delegates, often found themselves during the wars having to defend an 
unpopular royal policy to the populace.  Nevertheless, without confronting the royal 
will directly, the courts were able to deploy various tactics, including remonstrance 
and procedural obfuscation, in order to delay and obstruct the passage of unpalatable 
measures presented by the crown. 
The stage was thus set for the conflict and co-operation which was to 
characterize relations between crown and gown throughout the wars.20  For the 
monarchy, the parlements’ repeated opposition to aspects of royal policy was a source 
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of considerable frustration.  The Chancellor, Michel de L’Hospital, blamed the courts 
for obstructing the enforcement of the king’s will regarding pacification and, 
therefore, exacerbating the troubles.21  In keeping with his role as foremost magistrate 
of the realm and the king’s mouthpiece, he repeatedly upbraided his judicial 
colleagues in a number of speeches.  In particular, he emphasized their subordination 
to the king and their duty to follow his commands: ‘it is necessary that the will of the 
judges accords with the intention of the legislator’, and ‘in this monarchy, the 
interpretation of the law belongs to the king and no other’.22  The royal policy of 
pacification, in particular, necessitated the reiteration of such tenets in the face of 
parlementaire defiance, underlined by the repeated declarations that the edicts be 
upheld inviolate, and that royal commissioners refer problematic cases back to the 
king in his council.  As it was stated to the parlement of Bordeaux, following their 
registration of the edict of Amboise, the troubles had been brought about ‘as much by 
disobedience to the king, discontent with justice and even the sovereign courts, as by 
dissension and division between subjects’.23  The situation was complicated by the 
division of opinion among parlementaires themselves about the best way to deal with 
the Huguenot ‘problem’, despite the façade of unanimity which they presented to the 
crown.24  Nevertheless, despite their ambivalence regarding the direction of religious 
policy, judges continued to be primarily committed to their dual obligation of 
upholding royal power and maintaining social order.25  The reinforcement of royal 
authority through the exercise of justice was practically demonstrated in the work of 
those select few entrusted with the task of enforcing the crown’s edicts of 
pacification.  Through this role, both magistrate and king might fulfil their 
responsibility to provide the people with peace as well as justice.26  This provision, 
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central to the coronation oath, formed part of the king’s duty to his subjects as their 
divinely appointed ruler, a task delegated to his judiciary. 
II 
Religion and the language of justice 
Royal power and the exercise of justice was dependent on the continuing status of 
France as a sacred monarchy.  The king’s consecration at his coronation underlined 
the sacerdotal nature of French kingship and the monarch’s position as God’s 
representative, as well as reinforcing his status as the ‘Most Christian king’.27  In such 
circumstances, religious disunity could be interpreted as an affront to the king’s 
divine authority.  In particular, as contemporaries recognized, there was evident 
tension between the coronation oath expressing the traditional obligation to protect 
the Catholic church and eradicate heresy, and the policy of conciliation pursued on 
and off by the French crown from 1560.28  The parlements, too, faced a dilemma as 
self-styled protectors of gallicanism (the promotion of an independent French 
Catholic church) and official enforcers of the royal will.29  There is no doubt that the 
simultaneous royal strategy for the accommodation of confessional difference and the 
reinforcement of respect for the crown was problematic, if not inherently 
contradictory.  Yet, as Olivier Christin has shown, the king’s desire for unity among 
his subjects focused on the upholding of the law through the enforcement of the edicts 
of pacification, rather than on religion.30  In an effort to overcome any contradiction, 
each pacification was presented explicitly as the king’s peace, drawn up in 
consultation with his closest advisers, and made for the good of his subjects and the 
kingdom.  It was implicit that its observance was necessary for the maintenance of his 
authority, and any resistance to those charged to enforce it could be construed as 
opposition to the monarchy itself.  Thus, at La Rochelle, the commissioners appointed 
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to undertake the duties of pacification in 1563 remarked on the diminished authority 
of crown magistrates and officials and so of the king’s estate, ‘to the great scandal of 
your true and loyal servants’.31  Pacification, therefore, was an exercise by the 
monarchy to ensure the loyalty of both sides, reinforcing royal authority by separating 
political obedience from religious allegiance.  So, whilst both confessions were 
allowed to defend and maintain the integrity of their faith, they were also expected to 
unite in their obedience to the crown.  However, conflicting tendencies towards unity 
and division could both draw on the universal language of justice. 
The twin pillars of religion and justice were repeatedly cited as the ‘mainstays 
and foundations of this realm’, as Henry IV put it to the assembly of the clergy at the 
time of the Edict of Nantes.32  Charles IX’s regal device was ‘piety and justice’, 
represented by two intertwined columns, and the iconography of justice accompanied 
rituals from the coronation to royal entries.33  Likewise, justice permeated the 
language of both those who supported and those who opposed religious coexistence in 
France.  Whilst the crown hoped that this debate would reaffirm its judicial authority, 
Catholic preachers stated that the king’s law as embodied in the edicts of pacification 
was contrary to God’s law which prescribed the extermination of heresy.34  This 
supposed divorce between royal and divine notions of justice, which encouraged the 
people to take the law into their own hands, was an affront not only to monarchical 
authority but also to the role of the judges.  It nurtured an alliance between the crown 
and its judiciary despite their differences over policy.  The importance of the proper 
execution of justice was acknowledged not only by the crown and its judicial 
representatives, as well as other officials involved in the complex process of 
pacification, but by delegations from both faiths.  The rhetoric of justice allowed 
subjects to remind the king of his obligations to them, the king to reinforce the 
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obedience owed to him by his subjects (especially his judges), and judges to defend 
their actions.  For the crown, the monopoly of the enforcement of justice in the hands 
of its representatives was necessary to the stability of the realm and the resolution of 
conflict.  As the wars progressed, the king increasingly emphasized in his edicts that, 
‘the administration of justice is one of the principal means for containing our subjects 
in peace and concord’.35  The 1577 Peace of Bergerac referred more explicitly to 
justice ‘rendered and administered to our subjects without any suspicion, hate or 
favour’.  It also began with an exhortation that God as ‘true judge’ was witness to the 
king’s maintenance of justice in the interests of his people, and added the Almighty to 
the king’s usual list of those notables he consulted before issuing an edict.36  Whilst 
the king and his judges mostly concerned themselves with the administration of 
justice in a strictly legal sense, divine justice and so-called natural justice, a more 
abstract notion of fairness, were also invoked by Catholic and Huguenot alike.37  A 
sense of injustice, in particular, was frequently expressed by both sides.38  The 
challenge for the monarchy was to convince all opinions that, just as the enforcement 
of justice as embodied in the edicts of pacification was the best means to achieve 
peace, so peace gave the greatest hope of providing the justice they all craved and 
bringing an end to the injustices they all condemned. 
Differing confessional interpretations of the law also shed light on the central 
issues of royal authority and the rights of the subject confronted by extraordinary 
judicial procedure.  More specifically, Catholic and Huguenot each provided their 
own gloss on what the royal will intended.  Bodin’s directive that, ‘it is a law both 
divine and natural that we should obey the edicts and ordinances of him whom God 
has set in authority over us, providing his edicts are not contrary to God’s law’, is 
instructive in this regard.39  How was God’s law in this instance to be interpreted?  
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Unsurprisingly, opinion differed as to whether God would approve the coexistence of 
different forms of Christianity.  The dispute between the faiths also encompassed 
what was believed to be in the best interests of the commonwealth and the public 
good, again a position open to much interpretation.  For many Catholics, the edicts of 
pacification demonstrated the apparent convergence of opinion on this issue between 
the crown and the Huguenots (religious toleration), and its divergence between the 
king and his Catholic subjects (religious conformity).  However, despite differing 
interpretations of the terms of the edicts and of God’s law, the faiths competed to 
demonstrate their loyalty through a recognition of royal justice embodied in the 
edicts.  In turn, many magistrates held that toleration of a religious minority was 
preferable to civil strife, an opinion which dominated royal policy for much of the 
1560s, under the stewardship of Chancellor L’Hospital, and beyond, and re-emerged 
among those of a ‘politique’ persuasion in response to the militancy of the Catholic 
League. 
Problems arose not only as a result of confessional difference.  The law and its 
application, as well as the very meaning of justice, was contested.  A gap often 
remained between the letter of the law and its implementation; local concerns could 
impinge on the judicial process.40  Thus, whilst the parlement at Bordeaux could state 
that the enforcement of the edicts of pacification would be carried out ‘with such 
diligence as good and loyal servants and judges are charged to do’, at other times they 
objected to the edicts on the grounds of their compromise of regional security.41  
Likewise, whilst the Reformers viewed themselves as essentially law-abiding, in order 
to ensure their survival they were frequently forced to violate the laws against 
assembly and worship.42  The mass of contradictions in both sides’ behaviour in 
relation to the maintenance of justice sometimes spilt over into legal wrangling 
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between lawyers of both faiths.  This was apparent in the negotiations for peace in the 
province of Dauphiné in 1581.  The Huguenot deputy and councillor of the parlement 
at Grenoble, Soffrey de Calignon, defended himself against the criticism that his 
coreligionists were responsible for the delay in the execution of the most recent edict 
of pacification in the region.  He rejected the idea that he and his fellow deputy had 
not done all they could to establish peace and had failed in their charge.  His critics 
had pointed out that he was ‘well versed in the law’ and ought not to be obstructing its 
enforcement.  Calignon justified his cautious approach by citing Plato, that the law is 
‘silent, which often works against the intention of legislation if it … is not handled by 
the magistrate with dexterity and applied according to people’s humour and the 
circumstances at the time’.43  In particular, the edicts abolished existing cases and 
established new legal parameters for confessional behaviour, risking the opposite of 
what they sought to establish by exacerbating the opportunity for confrontation.  The 
return of property sequestered during the wars was only one of the most controversial 
issues.44  Yet it is clear that there were much more fundamental problems with the 
implementation of justice in the provinces which needed addressing before there 
could be any chance that the edicts would be enforced effectively. 
III 
Royal authority and justice 
The significance of the rule of law was of the highest importance to the guarantee of 
tolerance in France.45  There was clear advantage for the crown, as principal law-
maker, in promoting the role of justice in restoring peace to the kingdom.  French 
subjects were exhorted to reconcile not as a Christian act, but in respect of the law as 
embodied in the royal edicts.  The peacemakers or brokers in such disputes were not, 
therefore, as was customary, those traditional reconcilers of social division, the 
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clergy.  This ‘secularisation’ of the peace process was a tendency already exhibited in 
earlier legislation.46  It was precisely because of the powerful religious element in the 
conflict that any hope of pacification required this non-confessional approach.47  The 
divorce between religious dispute and judicial necessity salved at least some 
consciences.  The crown’s emphasis that religious plurality only represented a 
temporary solution to the troubles doubtless helped too.  As a result, only in 
exceptional cases did royal officials overtly oppose the monarchy.  This was the case, 
strikingly, with the sieur de Flassans at Aix-en-Provence, who whilst declaring his 
loyalty to the crown opposed the toleration of ‘heretics’.  Yet Flassans is an extreme 
example, resorting to sedition and violence in pursuit of his aims, ‘to the great scandal 
of justice’, exhibiting such irreverence towards both magistracy and crown that the 
whole of Provence was said to have lived in fear.48  Most officers disgruntled with 
royal policy chose rather to drag their feet over the enforcement and to oppose the 
terms of the edicts on more legalistic grounds. 
Justice was often seen to be the principal casualty of the conflict dividing the 
realm.  Prior to the wars, there had already been numerous complaints regarding the 
non-enforcement of justice in the provinces as confessional confrontations escalated.  
In late 1560, royal officials told increasingly familiar stories of order only just being 
maintained in their localities: the parlement of Bordeaux appealed to the Cardinal of 
Lorraine to safeguard the provision of royal authority and justice in Guyenne in the 
face of religious division.49   Concerns were also raised regarding the absence, or 
inactivity, of high-ranking royal officials, inviting crown intervention to ensure the 
effective enforcement of its legislation.50  In particular, suspicions were aroused about 
the divided loyalties of judges, seemingly proven by their inertia in the face of 
religious violence.  Military governors, such as Guy de Daillon at Poitiers, 
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complained about the failure of the local judiciary to act.51  The tension between 
judges and commanders, the application of the law or the use of force, which was to 
become so prominent in later years, was thus already evident, notably in the 
troublesome provinces of the south and west.  The presence of armed Huguenots in 
the towns was particularly worrisome to the authorities, encouraging a combined legal 
and strong-arm response.  Thus, at Monclar in the Agenais, in January 1561, local 
Huguenots were urged to desist from holding armed assemblies in obedience not just 
to ‘human law’ but to ‘divine law’, or they would be hanged.52  In Provence, whilst 
trying to enforce the Edict of January 1562, the royal commissioners declared that 
they needed first to return the province to the ‘fear of justice’.53  Furthermore, they 
found that local troublemakers deflected the accusations against them by counter-
accusing the judges of being religiously suspect ‘to the great scandal of justice’.54  In 
such circumstances of threat and counter-threat, the need to give armed protection to 
judges in the course of carrying out their duties was recognized, backing up justice 
with force. 
The ambiguous role of violence as both the main threat to, and the guardian of, 
justice was set to continue.  With the descent into war, a renewed urgency infused 
appeals to the crown for the provision of protection and justice, ‘unfettered justice’ as 
the Reformers of Orléans put it.55  Even in peacetime, the intimidation carried on.  In 
October 1563, the commissioners to Saintonge complained that they would be placing 
their lives in too much danger without an armed guard to accompany them to St-Jean-
d’Angély, where there was only an ‘illusion of justice’.56  Even the terrain could be 
viewed as hostile to the exercise of justice, as in the region of Nevers, described as ‘a 
mass of woodland’ between its towns, where those with firearms could conceal 
themselves.57  In December 1563, the procureur general of the parlement at Bordeaux, 
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Antoine de Lescure, reported in despair how, despite the best efforts of the 
commissioners, the situation in Guyenne was as bad as ever.  He was unable to take 
effective action because of a shortage of means, forces and money, the latter in 
particular an obstacle to the execution of justice.  He continued that justice was held 
in contempt, with refusals to pay fines or to give evidence for fear of being killed.  
This had been the case recently at Castillon where he had been unable to find a single 
sergeant, notary or witness prepared to be involved.  His conclusion was that ‘justice 
today consists of force and violence’.58  A similar picture emerges from provinces 
across France, with the continuing armament of both sides seen as a particular 
problem, underlining the difficulties faced by those charged with enforcing the 
edicts.59
The members of the parlements, especially that of Paris, were closely involved 
from the beginning with the debates involving the initial adoption of the crown’s 
favoured policy of toleration in the early 1560s.  Parlementaires were included in the 
deliberations preceding the Edict of July 1561, as well as those at Saint-Germain 
which led to the Edict of January 1562, which permitted Huguenot worship for the 
first time, despite the parlements’ later objections and initial refusals to ratify it.60  
This demonstrates clearly the tension between the judges’ role as executors of the 
royal will, and the fears of some of them that toleration might lead to an increase, 
rather than lessening, of civil strife.  Above all, they were agreed that the restoration 
of order was paramount and recognized that the law as stated in crown legislation had 
to be upheld, a task which some of them took on directly by the enforcement of royal 
justice in the provinces.  However, as bodies, the parlements were initially 
marginalized when it came to the enforcement of the edicts of pacification.61  Instead, 
the crown drew mainly from the membership of the Paris parlement and that of the 
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royal council (the maîtres des requêtes) for its commissioners, with whom other royal 
officials (including the courts) were supposed to co-operate.  A certain amount of 
prestige was attached to such a position, but it also invited close scrutiny of the 
appointee’s actions.  Despite the fact that some of their number were suspected of 
harbouring partisan sympathies, the commissioners made a concerted effort to 
exercise neutrality in their judgement of confessional disputes, as the crown itself had 
urged.62  They achieved this through assertion of their judicial status and the use of 
the rhetoric of justice, rendering the confessional make-up of the commissioners 
themselves largely irrelevant to the judgements they made.  As far as the crown at 
least was concerned, much more important was their ability to uphold royal authority 
in the face of local confessional and judicial hostility, hence the oft-repeated emphasis 
on finding impartial judges.  The royal commissioners were to (be seen to) set aside 
their religious prejudices through a rigorous implementation of the law. 
Viewing the law as the guarantor of security and order, legal practitioners 
would have believed themselves ideally suited for the role of enforcing the edicts, 
which encompassed the peaceful resolution of conflict, a practical adaptation to 
circumstance, and the reordering of a society in turmoil.63  It was men of the law who 
were most readily associated with, and most strongly advocated, the benefits of peace 
during the wars.64  In particular, they lauded its role in ensuring the proper 
functioning of the state and the maintenance of justice.  As Jacques de La Guesle put 
it to the Paris parlement in 1595, ‘When things proceed according to their order, to 
which only complete peace can restore us, justice will be the first to benefit’.65  The 
experience of the wars and the attempts to pacify the kingdom taught the judiciary a 
salutary lesson, as is clearly demonstrated in the works published after the conflict of 
Antoine Loisel, a prominent Parisian lawyer who served on the chambre de l’édit in 
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Guyenne.  He advocated a juridical solution to the troubles including adherence to the 
edicts and closer co-operation between ecclesiastical and secular courts.66  Although 
the judiciary were, then, temperamentally inclined to support the cause of peace, the 
edicts of pacification presented them with a dilemma.  The parlements, in particular, 
were torn between their duties as royal servants and the promotion of their own, and 
their localities’, interests.  The actions of the monarchy in other respects, too, 
threatened to encroach on their powers, and detrimentally affected relations between 
the two. 
IV 
Judges and Kings 
The Wars of Religion coincided with concerted efforts by the crown to regulate the 
activities of the judiciary and provided a more pressing urgency for such reform.  For 
the Chancellor, Michel de L’Hospital, the need to reform royal justice was linked 
directly to his strategy to increase royal authority and restore peace to the kingdom.  
His programme to overhaul the judicial system, ‘in as much need of reform as the 
Church’67, culminating in the ordinance issued at Moulins in 1566, was designed to 
promote the power and prestige of the monarchy, as well as to rectify the problems 
created in the lesser jurisdictions of the kingdom by the spread of venality.68  The 
proposed reforms were wide-ranging and contained a potent mixture of 
encroachments on the judiciary’s fiercely defended privileges.  Less explosively, 
some of the measures touched on the duties of those sent out to enforce the edicts of 
pacification.  Notably, in the provinces, some royal commissioners found themselves 
with the additional title and responsibilities of a surintendant de la justice, charged 
with overseeing judicial affairs in their assigned region.69  The members of the 
Reformed church at Orléans believed that the appointment of such an official would 
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allow them ‘to make their complaints freely and to have unfettered justice in order to 
punish those who contravened the king’s edicts and public freedom’.70  More specific 
regulation was evident with the establishment in 1565 of the so-called chambres 
neutres, chambers of judges drawn from the parlements to deal with the outstanding 
disputes arising from the enforcement of the 1563 Edict of Amboise.71  These bodies 
were appointed to continue the work of the commissions in delivering impartial 
justice to the faiths and so preventing a return to the troubles.  Yet they, too, faced 
obstruction over the issue of jurisdiction from the larger body of the parlements from 
which they were drawn, as did the confessionally-mixed chambres de l'édit 
established in 1576.72  So concerned was the crown regarding parlementaire 
opposition to the introduction of the chambres in the Edict of Beaulieu, that it was 
forced through the Paris parlement without proper deliberation in a lit de justice.73  
The parlements would continue to object to what they viewed as an erosion of their 
judicial competence, and the chambres to struggle against the interference of the 
sovereign courts in their affairs.  In 1579, clarification of jurisdictional responsibility 
was requested by the chambre based at Agen, 'to avoid the contrariety of judgements 
detrimental to royal justice and damaging to your subjects’ in the province of 
Guyenne.74  Specifically, it requested the king's 'reglement' designed to address the 
problem of overlap and confusion between the parlements and their dependent 
chambers.  The twenty-seven articles of this document detail the judicial complexities 
of the enforcement by the late 1570s, reflected also in successive edicts.75  The 
chambers’ reports to the crown tend to reinforce the importance of the judicial 
effectiveness of their role in the restoration of order to the most troublesome regions 
of the kingdom.76  Yet by 1581, so notorious had the lack of justice in Guyenne 
become that it resulted in a heated exchange of correspondence between Henry III and 
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Henry of Navarre, the provincial governor and leader of the Huguenots.  Navarre 
emphasized in particular that his coreligionists had no hope of ‘reason and justice’ 
from the chambers of the edict set up specifically to hear their cases.77  Finally, the 
prominence given to the re-establishment of the chambres in the Edict of Nantes was 
the main cause of the parlements’ resistance to its registration.78  Such jurisdictional 
conflicts underline once more the difficulties of enforcing justice during the wars, and 
this was far from being the only challenge which royal policy was to face. 
Judicial complexities on a local level made the enforcement of the edicts even 
more problematic.  The governor of Châtellerault reported in 1563 how a combination 
of justice being entrusted to several different bodies, and corruption leading to 
confessional bias, had complicated his task.  He was keen to defend himself against 
accusations that he had not fulfilled his duties, inviting the crown to judge whether, 
within the constraints he faced, his actions were ‘good or not’.79  The complexities of 
enforcing the edicts in the provinces reflect not only the difficulties of 
accommodating confessional differences and peculiar local concerns, but were also 
compounded by the myriad laws and customs governing the various regions over 
which the commissioners seemed to be riding roughshod.  Nevertheless, whilst forced 
on the monarchy by a desperate situation, the edicts provided the opportunity for the 
crown to circumvent the obstacles usually placed in its way by regional legal 
variation.  In considering the capacity of the crown to assert its will during the wars, it 
is important not to exaggerate the effectiveness of royal authority in the provinces 
hitherto (or indeed later).  Yet the exceptional circumstances of the civil wars 
provided the opportunity for the introduction of measures which were to be applied on 
a nationwide basis by central agents of the crown.  The argument that a national 
solution was required to restore peace to the realm, however, did not erode deep-
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seated provincial suspicion and hostility towards encroachments from the centre, 
whatever their declared aims. 
Local authorities objected to the central imposition of commissioners to 
enforce the peace, both because they fundamentally disagreed with the crown’s belief 
that its toleration policy offered the best solution to the troubles and because they 
were anxious about the erosion of their autonomy.  Despite the fact that it was judges 
who took the primary role in enforcing the edicts, the provincial parlements fiercely 
opposed the jurisdictional insult which, as they saw it, the commissions represented.  
Ferociously committed to safeguarding their spheres of responsibility in the locality, 
the courts used all means at their disposal to obstruct the commissioners in their work 
and to complain to the crown about their activities.  In 1571, the councillors of the 
parlement at Toulouse were particularly aggrieved that the commissioners had 
annulled their judgements to the detriment 'of the honour, splendour and authority of 
sovereign justice'.80  The particular subject at issue was the restoration of Huguenots 
to office, and the parlement questioned whether the commissioners were, in this 
regard, overreaching their commission.  The following year, the parlement wrote 
again to the crown, regarding its attempts to restore ‘the integrity and dignity of 
justice’ within its jurisdiction.81  In August 1563, royal commissioners Antoine 
Fumée and Jerosme Angenoust met with considerable obstruction from the parlement 
of Bordeaux disgruntled by its marginalization in the process of enforcement.  As they 
commented to the king, a clash with the court over the authority of their commission 
would be ‘prejudicial to your service and in contempt of justice’, and their actions 
would quickly attract the calumny of the people who would thereby lose respect for 
the judiciary as a whole.82  This fear appeared later to be confirmed by the hostile 
reception that these commissioners felt they received in the course of their duties.  
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Even when the parlement did agree to comply, the commissioners’ position was made 
impossible by the jurisdictional claims of different chambers within the court. 
Authorities were expected to accord the commissioners due respect in 
accordance with their status as agents of the royal will.  Sensitivities were such that 
individual commissions sometimes spelt out the exact order of precedence on 
ceremonial occasions, as for commissioner Angenoust in Provence for the 
enforcement of the 1570 edict.  He was to enter the court of the parlement of Aix after 
its presidents but before its councillors.83  Commissioner Antoine Fumée emphasized 
that ‘he did not wish to do anything contrary to the honour and authority of the court’ 
at Toulouse.84  Such instances suggest that the commissioners were more concerned 
to smooth ruffled parlementaire feathers than to provoke a confrontation which might 
have further jeopardized their work.  For their part, the parlements were expected to 
offer assistance to the commissioners by passing on any information they had about 
relevant cases, as well as facilitating their enquiries in other ways.  The two groups of 
royal judges were supposed to complement one another, both, after all, represented 
the king’s law, but the parlementaire sense of displacement was evident.  For the 
parlement at Bordeaux, such disquiet was felt as early as 1562.  Writing to the king 
regarding the enforcement of the Edict of January, the court urged that much more 
would be accomplished if the local judiciary and the royal commissioners were 
allowed to work alongside each other as under his royal predecessors.  Such a solution 
would not only save money, but would avoid ‘great damage’ to his service and ensure 
‘the total fulfilment of your will’.85  Parlementaire discontent at royal determination 
to bypass their jurisdictional claims was set to continue.  However, the peculiar 
antagonism which the commissioners faced in the jurisdictions of the parlements of 
Guyenne, Languedoc and Provence, may also reflect the intensity of confessional 
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feeling in these provinces, where the Huguenots represented a significant and 
threatening minority. 
Beyond the complexities of confessional politics and jurisdictional jealousies, 
the obstruction commissioners faced from local officials in carrying out their charge 
could also involve open flouting of the terms of an edict or its non-enforcement.  In 
Toulouse, the parlement, the estates and the municipal council banded together to 
oppose the commissioners to Languedoc in 1565, instead seeking their replacement 
by local judges.86  Indeed, many authorities felt that they had been carrying out their 
duties quite successfully without the snub which external interference represented.  
Prior to the wars, in December 1561, the magistrates of Dijon protested about the 
recent royal amnesty granted to religious prisoners who they had worked so hard to 
bring to justice.87  More provocatively still, part of the brief of the commissioners was 
to report back on, and if necessary to investigate, the reliability of local officials with 
regard to enforcing the edicts.88  In late 1563 and early 1564, steps were taken to 
proceed against officials in the region of Maine for contraventions of the Edict of 
Amboise.89  The commissioners to La Rochelle informed the king that the ‘inequality’ 
of provision in the town ‘proceeded from the excessive affection which some of your 
judicial officials carry for their religion’, and suggested that these judges ought to be 
allowed ‘to transfer to other jurisdictions’.90  Conversely, commissioners were often 
specifically authorized to make use of the local judiciary to assist them in their 
assignment, as was the case for Michel Quelain and Gabriel Myron in the Lyonnais.  
They were told to appoint ten royal judges from the présidial or lawyers to sit in 
judgement on those who had infringed the edicts.91  Similarly, the king commanded 
the parlement and other royal officials in Dijon to choose ten of their number to take 
on this task, preferring judges with experience and not ‘attached to any party except to 
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the service of the king’ since ‘the tranquillity of the province will depend on their 
judgements’.92  The importance of gaining the co-operation of local officials who 
could be trusted is emphasized by marshal Biron’s comment on the need for justice to 
be administered by ‘good and prudent judges which will greatly satisfy everyone and 
will be the means to secure obedience’.93  It was a plea reiterated by commissioners 
Fumée and Angenoust, whose efforts were greatly impeded by the difficulty of 
finding ‘judges above suspicion’ to deal with a backlog of cases relating to the 
peace.94  The involvement of local officials also strengthened their association with, 
and to some extent legitimated, a controversial central directive. 
As important as finding ‘good’ judges was their delivery of impartial justice.  
This was underlined by Charles IX in a letter to the governor of Languedoc, Damville, 
desiring ‘such equitable justice’ that no-one can complain, ‘the means by which to 
repel calumny, to make my affairs prosper, and my subjects content’.95  Bernard 
Prevost, leader of the judges who replaced the suspended parlement of Aix, echoed 
the hopes of many ‘that the equal distribution of justice … will contain both (sides) in 
peace and obedience’.96  Even-handed justice represented the fulfilment of the 
monarch’s obligation to his subjects, but it was difficult for judges of whatever 
persuasion to appear completely neutral in their judgements.  In attempting to raise 
themselves above the passions which divided communities, and enforcing the letter of 
the law rather than a confessional interpretation of it, the commissioners would attract 
the antagonism of both faiths.97  Accusations of bias would later be deflected by 
designating representatives of both faiths to participate in the commissions, a 
principle established in the chambres de l’édit.  Meanwhile, in such a volatile 
situation, there were bound to be clashes with the royal officials charged with 
enforcing the edicts, and questions raised about their credibility.  The observation of 
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the law, that is the royal will, was paramount to these crown agents, but peace was 
only one means to this end, as the examples which follow testify. 
In 1571, the Huguenots of Lyon complained that the surintendant de la justice, 
Michel Larcher, had consistently harassed them and ought to be removed from trying 
any cases concerning religion.  These, they continued, should be passed on to 'not 
partisan but peaceful' judges who would deal with contraventions of the edict 'fairly 
and equitably’.98  Larcher's judicial position in Lyon had fluctuated due to the 
fortunes of the wars, and a summary of his career quickly explains Huguenot 
animosity towards him.  Appointed in 1568 to enforce the Edict of Longjumeau, with 
the resumption of war Larcher was authorized to seize Huguenot property, to remove 
Huguenots from office, and to oversee the sale of Huguenot goods.99  He did not 
seem, therefore, the most appropriate person to be put in charge of enforcing the 1570 
edict of pacification.  Nevertheless, his removal from office in late 1571 was 
accompanied by warm words about his good service to the crown.100  Philippes 
Gourreau's successive roles as enforcer of royal wartime levies on the Huguenot 
inhabitants of Touraine, Anjou and Maine in April 1570, and six months later as 
commissioner for the implementation of the most recent edict from which they were 
supposed to benefit, recall the seemingly contradictory position of Larcher in the 
same period.101  As the transition from war to peace and back again occurred with 
greater frequency, many more commissioners must have found themselves similarly 
compromised by their fluctuating role in line with royal policy. 
However, above all, such examples remind us that the commissioners were 
primarily servants of the crown, and their hands were tied as a result to enforce the 
law as embodied in the most recent piece of royal legislation, however inconsistent 
with an earlier stance or inappropriate to the divisions and complex problems found 
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locally.  After all, these were not venal officials, but appointees answerable to the 
king, following a tradition of extraordinary judicial commissions appointed to deal 
with provincial disputes by sixteenth-century monarchs, albeit in a new and 
unprecedented context.102  In keeping with this tradition, appointments were usually 
for a fixed period, after which the commissioners might be transferred to other duties, 
preventing the continuity from which the pacification might well have benefited.  This 
meant, too, that they had little time to get to grips with the intricacies of local discord.  
As a consequence, the natural distrust of inhabitants and officials was compounded, 
and it was widely held that the commissioners were unlikely to make the right 
decision about local issues which they could not fully understand.  Any indication of 
confessional bias only reinforced this perception.  In Tours in 1568, the municipal 
authorities complained that Jean Cornet was conducting a pro-Huguenot commission 
in his investigation of past actions, and that he therefore ought to be replaced by 
another judge 'of greater quality' and 'Catholic'.103  In most cases, as here, it was not 
just the partisan actions of the commissioner that were at issue, but also questions of 
jurisdictional and legal competence. 
 In 1565, the Huguenot nobility of Maine claimed that those sent to enforce the 
edicts 'thought themselves wiser than the edict of pacification', bending the law to suit 
themselves, and judging not according to the equity of the law but 'according to their 
own particular passions', making their actions no less pernicious than those who used 
physical violence against Huguenots.104  Demonstrating their own competence 
regarding legal authority, the nobles cited Aristotle’s view that there is nothing more 
harmful for the state than a magistrate who prefers his judgement to the authority of 
the law.  The particular target of their wrath was the commissioner Gabriel Myron, 
'the most pernicious, unjust and miserable man that the earth contains ... not so much 
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a devoted papist as a wicked judge', so that the local Huguenots were deprived of 
justice.  Myron’s actions were believed to be the reason that the authority of the king 
and the justice of his commissions were ‘commonly regarded with scorn and 
contempt in this province’ where the wicked live ‘without law, without reason, 
without judgement and without shame’.  The expectation of the faiths that the 
commissioners would ensure justice for all the crimes perpetrated against them was to 
be very different from what the crown had authorized, especially with regard to 
burying the hatchet of confessional difference. 
Probably the most controversial issue raised by this apparently single-minded 
implementation of the law was the declaration of successive edicts that the slate of 
bloodshed and confiscation perpetrated during the wars was to be wiped clean.  This 
so-called policy of oubliance urged that crimes committed during periods of warfare 
were to be forgotten and not subject to prosecution or retribution.105  Not surprisingly, 
both sides saw this legislation as contentious and protested loudly against what they 
saw as the failure to deal with the past misdemeanours and injustices against them.  
The policy may be construed as an extension of the customary royal prerogative of 
bestowing mercy or granting amnesty, but more practical considerations swayed the 
decision.  Uppermost in the minds of the king and the judges was the overwhelming 
necessity to restore order to the kingdom which, they believed, only such a sanction 
could achieve.  It was a necessary part of the purging of the infection of civil strife 
from the body politic.106  Commissioners de Bourgneuf and de Masparraulte 
described the success of this approach in their commission to Poitou in 1563; ‘This 
way of proceeding … has caused things to quieten down’.107  The importance of 
forgetting past crimes in the interests of peace is reflected in its increasing 
prominence in the edicts of pacification.  It is particularly noticeable in the first two 
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articles of the Edict of Saint-Germain of 1570; previously the proscription was 
subordinated to a general statement at the end of an edict.108  Nevertheless, it 
remained a controversial and complex directive to enforce.  It would require all the 
assiduity and patience of the crown and its judiciary to tread their way warily, but 
successfully, through this and other confessional minefields. 
V 
The wars were a major test for the monarchy and the effectiveness of its authority, but 
most parties continued to be keen to demonstrate their loyalty to the crown despite its 
unpopular religious policy (and their clear infractions of the edicts).  Ultimately, royal 
power was reinforced by the exercise of justice, and, thus, the application of the law 
sustained the authority of the monarchy throughout the religious wars.  Royal edicts 
asserted the crown’s judicial prerogative by forbidding the Huguenots from 
establishing their own magistracy, and forbidding local judges cognisance of cases 
without crown approval.109  Successful assertion of this prerogative through the edicts 
of pacification, both prior to the rise and after the demise of the Catholic League, 
proved essential to crown authority.  It is striking that the greatest period of 
monarchical crisis during the wars, the late 1580s, saw no edict of pacification, and 
the decision in that decade to treat with the League and abolish the edicts led to a 
diminution rather than strengthening of royal authority.110  This is contrary to the 
traditional view that a policy of toleration is an indication of monarchical 
weakness.111  The irony is that its concessions to a religious minority allowed the 
crown to assert itself at a time when it could be seen to be most vulnerable.  However 
unconsciously, then, a degree of religious pluralism shored up a monarchy under 
threat from noble faction and civil crisis.  Thus, the Edict of Nantes of 1598 
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continued, rather than initiated, a process of confessional reconciliation designed to 
bring peace to the kingdom and, in so doing, to fortify royal justice.112
Despite the challenges it faced, monarchical power was able to weather the 
storm of religious and civil dissent to re-emerge with its judicial authority bruised, but 
intact.113  The relationship between judges and kings, whilst severely tested and 
fraught with disagreement, remained mutually reinforcing in the shared desire to 
uphold justice and order.  The edicts of pacification were both the product and the 
price of that alliance, an outcome which was destined to shape confessional relations 
in France for more than a century.  The appointment of extraordinary commissioners 
who could carry out the king’s will during periods of both war and peace advanced 
the cause of the royal prerogative of a monopoly of justice.  The effective interplay of 
royal authority and justice during the wars is evident from Chancellor L’Hospital’s 
judicial reform programme to the use of these commissioners, who are often 
identified as proto-intendants, although their remit was related to a specific set of 
circumstances unique to the period.114  Although they were to face considerable and 
concerted opposition in the execution of their charge, the mechanisms which these 
officials established, however briefly, were to have lasting results.  In this way, it is 
possible to locate, among the multi-faceted legacy of the religious wars, judicial and 
administrative developments which would foreshadow characteristics more readily 
associated with seventeenth-century Bourbon government.115
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